Three criteria for evaluating the possible performance of water resource systems are discussed. These measures describe how likely a system is to fail (reliability), how quickly it recovers from failure (resiliency), and how severe the consequences of failure may be (vulnerability). These criteria can be used to assist in the evaluation and selection of alternative design and operating policies for a wide variety of water resource projects. The performance of a water supply reservoir with a variety of operating policies illustrates their use.
INTRODUCTION
The ability of existing and proposed water resource systems to operate satisfactorily under the wide range of possible future demands and hydrologic conditions is an important system characteristic. The likely performance of water resource systems is often described by the mean and variance of benefits, pollutant concentrations, or some operating variable. This paper develops additional performance criteria that capture particular aspects of possible system performance which are especially important during periods of drought, peak demands, or extreme weather. The proposed criteria are called reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability. These performance measures should be useful in the selection of water resource system capacities, configurations, operating policies, and targets.
Bayesian methods are one natural and rigorous way of dealing with the uncertainty which arises in many planning studies. Davis et al. [1972] and Benjamin and Cornell [1970] review the basic methodology. When Bayesian analysis is combined with multiattribute utility theory [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976] , the analysis can incorporate the variability in system performance and uncertainty in planning parameters with a single decision maker's attitudes toward risk. Examples of the use of multiattribute utility theory in water resources planning are given by Keeney and Wood [1977] , Goicoechea et al. [1979] and Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein [1979] .
Unfortunately, there are several drawbacks to this methodology. In particular the method requires the development of a utility function which incorporates a decision maker's or society's tradeoffs between competing system attributes and also their attitudes toward risk. Not only is such a function very difficult to construct for a single identified 'decision maker,' but such a function will probably not reflect the priorities of all groups having significant influence on the 1Now with the International Development Center of Japan, Tokyo, Japan.
Copyright ¸ 1982 by the American Geophysical Union. The multiobjective multiple-decision-maker character of public decisions is widely recognized, and multiobjective planning algorithms have been developed [Cohon, 1978] . The value of a multiobjective framework in water resources planning is that the benefit and disbenefit bundle associated with alternative projects and proposals can be better identified. As a result, the public as well as different participating public agencies and interest groups can better evaluate proposed projects using their own unarticulated objectives.
Advocated here is the inclusion of special risk-related system performance criteri a within the multiobjective analysis of alternatives. By adding these performance measures to those already used to describe the expected costs and benefits of projects, individuals and groups should be better able to understand how a project might perform in the uncertain future. If they better understand how water resource systems may operate and how unpleasant any periods of unsatisfactory performance may be, individuals will be prepared to make better decisions. Of interest are system performance criteria which are suitable for characterizing the stochastic and dynamic performance of such water resource systems as wastewater treatment plants, multireservoir water supply systems, or flood-flow forecasting and control systems. Some recent work on the properties of ecological systems is relevant to this problem. Holling [1973] used the concept of resilience to describe the ability of a dynamic multispecies ecological system to persist with the same basic structure when subjected to stress. Resilience is to be contrasted with stability, which pertains to the variability of species densities over time. Holling points out that some systems may appear to be unstable because population densities vary over wide ranges. However, such systems may be very resilient, for they can persist after severe shocks or during periods of stress because of their capacity to accommodate variability in individual •pecies densities. Very stable systems may not be able to cope with large variations in population densities.
They may disintegrate if they suffer large losses due to fire or disease, the introduction of a new pollutant, or a radically new manageihent strategy.
Later work has extended this idea to environmental/ ecosystem management [Fiering and Holling, 1974; Holling, 1978] . These authors question the wisdom of management strategies which force natural systems to be highly stable. Enforcing stability may result in changes in the structure of managed systems which could greatly reduce their resilience. For example, enhancement of salmon spawning should lead to more productive fisheries and, as a result, greater fishing pressure. However, this greater pressure is very likely to cause the less productive stocks to become extinct or nearly so. This would leave the fishing ecosystem precariously dependent on a few artificially enhanced species [Larkin, 1979] tion can be describea by a stationary stochastic process. That is, the probability distributions that describe the output time series do not change with time. Of course this is only an approximation of reality but it is often quite reasonable. For instance, the probability distribution of streamflows at a particular site may change over time due to climatic shifts or land use changes in the drainage area. Still, it is both convenient and satisfactory in many cases to assume that streamflows are a stationary process over typical planning horizons.
Reliability
Denote a system's output state or status by the random variable Xt at time t, where t takes on discrete values 1, 2, 3, ß ß ß. In general, the possible values of Xt can be partitioned into two sets' $, the set of all satisfactory outputs, and F, the set of all unsatisfactory (failure) outputs. At any time t the system output is assumed to be an element of one of these sets. The reliability of a system can be described by the frequency or probability a that a system is in a satisfactory state:
An alternate definition of reliability not adopted here is that reliability is the probability that no failure occurs within a fixed period of time, often taken to be the planning period. If the planning period is a single period, then the two definitions are equivalent. Reliability is a widely used concept in water resources planning. Reliability is sometimes taken to be the opposite of risk. That is, the risk or probability of failure is simply one minus the reliability a. Both reliability and this definition of risk do not describe the severity or likely consequences of a failure. The possible severity of failures can be described by other criteria, such as resiliency and vulnerability.
Resiliency
Resiliency will describe how quickly a system is likely to recover or bounce back from failure once failure has occurred. ff failures are prolonged events and system recovery is slow, this may have serious implications for system designß One would like to design systems which can recover and return to a satisfactory state rapidly.
Resiliency may be given a mathematically precise definition. Let Tr be the length of time a system's output remains unsatisfactory after a failureß The resiliency of a system can be defined as the inverse of the expected value of Tr. To derive a mathematical expression for that expected value, let
Then (l/n) Y•t= 1 n Zt is the fraction of time from period t = 1 to t = n that the system output or performance is satisfactory. In the long run this fraction approaches the probability of the performance being satisfactory, and hence equals system reliability: 
Vulnerability
Here vulnerability refers to the likely magnitude of a failure, if one occurs. Even when the probability of failure is small, attention should be paid to the possible consequences of failure. Hailing [1978] discusses the idea of safe-fail as opposed to fail-safe. Attempts to maximize system reliability are attempts to make a system's operation failure-free. Still, few systems can be made so large or so redundant that failures are impossible. Even when it is possible to raise levees high enough or make water supply reservoirs large enough that failure is hard to imagine, it is often not economical to do so. After a point, effort is better expended making the consequences of failure less severe and more acceptable than in trying to eliminate the possibility of failure altogether. Early warning systems, flood insurance, and flood-proofing of structures are three approaches to decreasing the costs of flooding when floods do occur. Likewise, the exclusion of buildings from floodways and the use of floodprone areas for parks, natural areas, and agriculture are other means of minimizing the costs of floods.
It is important to realize that efforts to maximize system efficiency and reliability can actually increase a system's vulnerability to costly failure should failure occur. Transformation of traditional agricultural systems to high yield single-species crops sets the stage for disaster should a new crop disease or pest develop. Likewise, flood control reservoirs and levees that control small floods create an image and sense of security; as a result, unwise development in partially protected areas can occur. This creates the potential for large losses should a large flood occur or a levee break. Replacement of small unreliable wastewater treatment plants by large well-managed regional facilities may decrease the frequency of plant failures, yet by concentrating the total treated wastewater flow in a single location, the impact and consequences of a breakdown in the biological oxidation process will be greatly magnified should the plant be overloaded or receive a slug of concentrated or toxic material [Adams and Gemmell, 1980] . The loss of a rear cargo door on the DC-10 aircraft due to improper latching provides an excellent illustration of failsafe versus safe-fail design. The blow out of the cargo door at high altitudes causes a rapid decompression of the cabin and the severing of control cables by the collapse of the floor separating the cabin and lower storage area. Commercial airlines emphasized design modifications and safety procedures to prevent such mishaps. Unfortunately, a failure occurred and many died. In some military aircraft, holes were cut in the floor separating the two •ompartments, allowing rapid decompression of the cabin should the cargo door be lost. This prevented structural damage to the aircraft and made the planes 'safe in failure. ' It is important that decision makers be aware of the vulnerability of a system to severe failure should a failure occur. This should be an important criterion in water resource system design and selection. To construct a mathematical index of system vulnerability, assume that the system performance variable Xt can take discrete values x•, ß '', Xn. TO construct a quantitative indicator of system vulnerability to severe failure should a failure occur, assign to each discrete failure state xj G F a numerical indicator of the severity of that state, denoted sj. Furthermore, let ej be the probability that xj, corresponding to sj, is the most With each policy the reservoir-irrigation system was simulated for 10,000 years to determine (1) the reliability a with which the summer irrigation target was met, (2) the resiliency •/of the system equal to the reciprocal of the average length of sequences of failure years, and (3) the vulnerablity v of the system equal to the average of the maximum deficit that occurred in each sequence of failure years. A failure year occurred whenever the summer release R was less than the target release T, equal to 4.5 x 107 m 3. Figure 8 illustrates the values of system reliability a, resiliency % and vulnerability v as a function of /3, the exponent in the loss function used to derive the various operating policies. As /3 increases, the penalty on large deficits becomes increasingly severe. As a result, as /3 increases, system reliability a decreases because the optimal policies incorporate a propensity to incur small deficits so as to minimize the expected loss from larger deficits at later Resiliency generally shows the same trend as reliability. For/3 = 0, system resiliency is high and sequences of failure years are very short. Deficits are very severe, often equaling the entire target. For/3 >-3, resiliency is low because periods of failure can be very long, although deficits are often small.
The vulnerability trend is different from that obtained with the other risk-related performance criteria. It achieves its maximum at/3 = 0 when almost every failure is a complete failure. It then decreases with increasing /3 to achieve a minimum at /3 = 2. Above /3 = 2, vulnerability actually increases with increasing/3. This occurs because operating policies derived with large /3 will frequently incur deficits much larger than is necessary. This saves water as a hedge against the possibility of even larger deficits in future periods. This tradeoff (for/3 > 2) decreases the reliability and resiliency as well as the vulnerability of the system's performance. Still, it is optimal with respect to each policy's loss function. This is shown by Table 2 The values of reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability in Figure 8 reveal some of the characteristics of reservoir system performance that can be obtained with reservoir policies that minimize the specified loss functions. Realistic policies probably correspond to/3 in the range of 1.0-2.0 and hence would have high reliability, modest resiliency, and close to minimal vulnerability. Figure 9 provides a more explicit description of the unavoidable tradeoff between vulnerability and reliability. One cannot have both the maximum possible reliability and minimum possible vulnerability.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, there exist tradeoffs among expected benefits, reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability. Use of the three risk criteria improves our ability to describe how often failures may occur, how long periods of unsatisfactory performance are likely to last, and just how severe failure might be. This was illustrated with a water supply reservoir example. There, high system reliability was accompanied by high system vulnerability. This information should be used to supplement other standard project evaluation criteria, including the distribution of project benefits and costs as well as various social and environmental impacts. By using improved descriptions of the possible nature of poor system performance, should it occur, individuals should be able to better understand the risks to which they are exposed by various project and no-project alternatives. The particular mathematical definitions advanced here for resiliency and vulnerability should be viewed as illustrative examples. Every planning situation is in some way unique and calls for creativity in the definition of appropriate performance descriptors, such as resiliency, reliability, and vulnerability. It is unlikely that a single mathematical defintion of these concepts will be appropriate or useful in all situations. However, recognition and description of the possibility of low-probability but undesirable consequences of alternative plans should be an important component of the planning process. Hence engineers and planners need to develop appropriate quantitative risk criteria that describe the undesirable events that individuals may experience as a consequence of particular investment or operating policy decisions.
